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ASSIGNING INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS: SILVERS V. 
SONY PICTURES 
Heather Sanborn· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Copyright Act establishes protection for original, creative works ofauthorship 
as a means of providing ex ante incentives for creativity. 1 But how real is that 
protection? Imagine that you have written a script and managed to have your play 
produced in a local community theater. A few years later, you find that a major 
Hollywood studio has taken your script, adapted it slightly, and made it into the next 
summer blockbuster, raking in millions without ever obtaining a license from you. Of 
course, you can sue them for infringement. But how much will that litigation cost and 
what are the risks of losing the suit? You will have to fight against a defendant with 
almost unlimited financial resources, so even if your case is strong, there is a real risk 
that you may not prevail. A better option might be to sell your accrued infringement 
claim to a third party who is better able to take on the financial risk of the litigation. 
This allows you to retain your copyright in the script and walk away with a tidy sum, 
without risking your life savings trying to win in a David-versus-Goliath fight against 
the Hollywood studio. But can you transfer the accrued claim without also selling your 
rights in the copyright itself? Will the third party investor have standing to bring the 
suit ifhe does not also own the copyright in the script? 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit answered no to both these questions. 2 In Silvers v. 
Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., the court, sitting en bane, found that accrued claims 
for infringement may be assigned only along with the underlying copyright. 3 The 
majority's decision is, however, riddled with problems. First, the majority ignores the 
common law background against which all statutes must be interpreted. Second, the 
majority opts for a logically inconsistent reading of the Copyright Act to justify its 
holding. Third, the majority draws an untenable analogy between standing to sue in 
patent and copyright cases. Finally, the court's conclusion contravenes the basic 
purposes of the Copyright Act: to provide ex ante incentives for creativity by pro-
viding protection to copyright holders, regardless of their wealth. This Note introduces 
the concepts central to the Silvers opinion by examining the standing rules under both 
the Copyright and Patent Acts. It then turns to an examination of the Silvers case itself, 
taking each of the problems created by the majority opinion in turn. 
• J.D., 2007, University of Maine School of Law. The Author wishes to thank Tom Ward for 
sparking her interest in the intricacies of intellectual property and recommending this case for comment. 
I. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129, 129 (2004) ("The standard justification for intellectual property is ex ante: the goal ofintellectual 
property is to influence behavior that occurs before the right comes into being."). 
2. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en bane, 402 F.3d 881 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
3. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d at 883. 
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II. THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHW 
The 1909 Copyright Act set in place a doctrine of indivisibility of ownership: a 
copyright owner "possessed an indivisible 'bundle of rights,' which were 'incapable 
of assignment in parts. "' 4 An assignment conveyed the totality of rights in the 
copyrighted work; anything less was considered a "mere license." 5 Licensees, whether 
exclusive or non-exclusive, lacked standing to sue and lacked the ability to record their 
licenses in the Copyright Office. 6 Licensees were also prohibited from reselling or 
sublicensing the rights they had acquired without express permission of the copyright 
owner. 7 
With the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress unbundled copyright 
ownership. 8 The 1976 Act provided that "[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in 
a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section I 06, 
may be transferred ... and owned separately. "9 Copyright ownership could be divided 
into an infinite number of discrete exclusive licenses, as the exclusive rights to 
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, display, and transmit 
under § I 06 could each be further subdivided by medium and by geographic and 
temporal scope. 10 This new statutory scheme effectively equated exclusive licensees 
with assignees under the old Act. 11 Exclusive license holders could now sue in their 
own name for infringement of their assigned rights: "The owner of any particular 
exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and 
remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title" 12 and may "institute an action 
4. Gardnerv. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting 3 MELVILLE 8. NIMMER&DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 10.0l[C][4](2001)). 
5. Id. at 778. 
6. Id. 
7. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting 3 MELVILLE 8. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ IO.Ol[C][4](2001)). 
8. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 779. 
9. 17 u.s.c. § 201(d)(2) (2000). 
I 0. For example, the owner of a copyright in a novel could grant one publishing company an exclusive 
license to distribute copies of the novel in Great Britain for ten years and another company the distribution 
rights for North America over the same period. See 3 MELVILLE 8. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT§ I0.02[A](2001). 
11. Id. 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2). Despite the apparent move by Congress to place exclusive licensees on par 
with copyright owners, the Ninth Circuit held in its much-criticized opinion in Gardner that, under the 
1976 Act, the prohibition on transferring exclusive licenses without express permission of the copyright 
holder remained. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781. The court arrived at this conclusion by reading the grant to 
exclusive license holders of "all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner" as a 
limited grant of authority that did not include the right to transfer the license to a third party. Id. at 780. 
The court reasoned that policy concerns justified a continued restraint on transferability of exclusive 
licenses in order to assure that the licensor would "be able to monitor the use of the copyright." Id. at 781. 
This outcome placed the presumption against assignment, and allowed express contractual language to 
overcome this presumption. The Ninth Circuit justified this presumption based on the need to balance 
"Congress' growing awareness of the need for free alienability and divisibility" and "the necessity to 
preserve the rights and control of the owners and creators." Id. However, a licensor who wanted to be able 
to monitor and control his exclusive licensees could exert such control by express provisions of the contract 
without the need for a presumption against transferability. The court does not adequately explain why such 
a presumption is needed or how it is justified by statutory language. 3 NIMMER, supra note 10, 
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for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of 
it." 13 In order to avoid a risk of duplicative suits that may arise when exclusive 
licensees can sue without joining their licensors, Congress provided notice and joinder 
provisions in§ 50l(b): 
The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action with a copy of 
the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright Office or 
otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall require that such 
notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision 
in the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit the intervention, of 
any person having or claiming an interest in the copyright. 14 
Thus, courts are able to notify stakeholders and consolidate the potential litigation 
concerning a particular copyright. 
As the text of§ 501 (b) suggests, the broad recordation provisions of the 1976 Act 
will help facilitate this notification and consolidation procedure. Section 3 0 of the 
1909 Act provided only for the recording of"assignments," 15 though the Copyright 
Office's practice was to record other documents, such as licenses, as well. 16 The 
language of the 1976 Act is significantly broader. Although transferees are not 
required to record under the Act, § 205(a) provides that "[a]ny transfer of copyright 
ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the 
Copyright Office." 17 The Act goes on to provide that "[r]ecordation ofa document in 
the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the 
recorded document" so long as the document reasonably identifies the work to which 
it pertains and the copyright for the work has been registered. 18 
III. ST ANDING TO SUE UNDER THE PA TENT ACT 
Unlike copyrights, patent rights are still governed by a doctrine of indivisibility 
that draws a strict line between assignments of title in the patent and "mere licenses." 19 
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1891 in Waterman v. Mackenzie, Justice Gray 
summarized the strict limitations on standing that flow from the indivisibility doctrine: 
The patentee or his assigns may ... assign, grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole 
patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout 
the United States; or 2d, an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or, 3d, the 
§ 10.02[8][4]. See also In re Golden Books Family Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 3 I I, 3 I 7-18 (Bankr. 0. Del. 
2001). 
13. 17 u.s.c. § 50l(b)(2000). 
14. Id. 
15. Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 30, 35 Stat. 1082, 1082 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2000)). 
16. 37 C.F.R. § 201.4 (2006). 
17. 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2000). The statute requires only that the document filed either be the original, 
signed document or be "accompanied by a sworn or official certification that it is a true copy of the original, 
signed document" in order to be eligible for recordation. Id. 
18. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c). 
19. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual 
Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1341 (2000) (quoting Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252,255 
(1891)). 
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exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United 
States. A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an assignment, properly 
speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right 
to sue infringers .... 20 
443 
Thus, a title in a patent could be divided only by geographic region. A subdivision of 
rights by any other category, 21 whether exclusive or non-exclusive, constituted a "mere 
license." 22 Justice Gray further explained, "In equity, as at law, when the transfer 
amounts to a license only, the title remains in the owner of the patent; and suit must be 
brought in his name, and never in the name of the licensee alone, unless that is 
necessary to prevent an absolute failure of justice, as where the patentee is the 
infringer, and cannot sue himself." 23 Modem courts continue to adhere to this 
indivisibility doctrine, though they allow an exclusive licensee to force the patentee 
into litigation by joining him as a voluntary or involuntary plaintiff, or, in some cases, 
as a defendant. 24 
There may be some good reasons for limiting licensees' rights to sue more sharply 
under the Patent Act than under the Copyright Act. First, the limitation on the 
divisibility of ownership of a patent is probably less of an impediment than the same 
limitation in copyright. 25 As Nimmer explained: 
When the doctrine of indivisibility was first enunciated the only effective manner in 
which copyrighted materials could be exploited was through the reproduction of 
copies ... Today the value of motion picture rights in a novel will often far exceed 
the value of the right to publish the work in book form .... [ A ]s a matter of com-
mercial reality, 'copyright' is now a label for a collection of diverse property rights 
each of which is separately marketable.26 
By contrast, the "commercial realities" of patent licensing are very different: it seems 
unlikely that the patent will frequently be more valuable when the rights to make, sell 
and use are separately vested in various owners. 27 
Second, and more importantly, patents are at a high risk of invalidation any time 
they are involved in an infringement suit, making it critical to involve the patentee, and 
not just exclusive licensees, in the decision to litigate and defend against any attempt 
20. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255 (citations omitted). 
21. In Waterman, the patentee assigned his patent to his wife. Id. at 253. The wife then granted back 
to her husband "the sole and exclusive right and license to manufacture and sell fountain penholders 
containing the said patented improvement throughout the United States." Id. Despite the broad language 
of this grant, the Court found that the grant to the husband was a "mere license" because it "did not include 
the right to use such penholders, at least if manufactured by third persons." Id. at 257. The husband thus 
could not bring an infringement suit. Id. 
22. Id. at 255. 
23. Id. 
24. Blair & Cotter, supra note 19, at 1350. 
25. Id. at 1371. 
26. 3 NIMMER, supra note 10, § 10.0l[A). 
27. Blair & Cotter, supra note 19, at 1371. "We suspect (although we know ofno relevant empirical 
data) that the type of transaction at issue in Waterman, in which the licensor transferred to the licensee the 
exclusive right to make and sell, but not to use, the patented invention, is relatively uncommon, and that 
most patent licenses transfer the rights to make, use, and sell, though perhaps subject to various 
restrictions." Id. 
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at invalidation. 28 Attempts to invalidate patents are frequently successful: before the 
consolidation of patent cases within the Federal Circuit, the defense of patent invalidity 
succeeded as often as 90 percent of the time in some circuits. 29 Even in the patent-
friendly Federal Circuit, roughly half of all litigated patents are invalidated. 30 As one 
commentator has suggested, it is not difficult "to imagine that in some instances the 
licensee might be tempted to provoke litigation in the hope that the patent will be 
declared invalid, thus freeing the licensee from the obligation to continue paying 
royalties to the licensor." 31 While it is certainly in the interest of public policy to 
invalidate patents that should not have been granted in the first place, it is a critical 
safeguard of patentee rights that the patentee be a party to any action that carries a risk 
of invalidating the patent in its entirety. Thus, the restrictions on standing in the patent 
realm seem to have some rational basis. In the copyright realm, where invalidation is 
not a real concern, 32 the liberalization of standing doctrine under the 1976 Act also 
makes sense. 
IV. ASSIGNING INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS 
A legal claim, or chose in action, whether arising in tort, by contract, or by statute, 
is considered personal property and is generally assignable. 33 The usual test for 
assignability of a claim is whether the cause of action would survive the death of the 
assignor. 34 The same holds true for statutory causes of action: "In the absence of any 
expression of a legislative intent to the contrary, a claim or award for damages for 
violation of a statute giving redress, compensatory in its nature, is assignable as a 
property right." 35 When a claim is for damage to property, the right to recover 
damages for the property can generally be assigned without conveying title in the 
property itself. 36 Though the assignment of a chose in action was prohibited at English 
common law, it has long been permissible under American common law.37 In fact, 
some American jurisdictions have gone so far as to state that the law evinces a policy 
favoring the assignability of claims.38 Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Civil 
28. Id. at 1361-62. 
29. Id. at 1361. 
30. Id. at 1361-62. 
31. Id. at 1362. 
32. See id. at 1372. 
33. 6A C.J.S. Assignments§ 43 (2004). 
34. Id.§ 44. 
35. Id. § 49. 
36. Id.§ 51. 
37. 14 AM. JUR. 20 Champerty, Maintenance, and Barratry § 1 (2005). In England, the assignment 
of a chose in action was considered "champertous." Id. An agreement was champertous, at common law, 
when one without an interest in another's litigation agreed to conduct the lawsuit at his own expense, in 
exchange for a share in the proceeds. Id. A contingent fee arrangement would also have been considered 
champertous under this definition, though they are generally allowed today. The doctrine of champerty has 
faded under American common law and is rarely invoked or enforced. Id. 
38. See, e.g., Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Riggs Nat'! Bank of Wash., D.C., 646 A.2d 
966,971 n.9 (D.C. 1994). 
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Procedure l 7(a), if a claim has been assigned in full, the assignee is the real party in 
interest and can sue in his own name without joining his assignor. 39 
A. Patent Infringement: Crown Die 
The Supreme Court faced the question in Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & 
Machine Works of whether the Patent Act limited the assignability of accrued 
infringement clairns.40 Relying heavily on the indivisible nature of the monopoly 
granted by the Patent Act, Chief Justice Taft warned that "[i]t is not safe ... in dealing 
with a transfer of rights under the patent law, to follow implicitly the rules governing 
a transfer of rights in a chose in action at common law.''41 Instead, he held that the 
statutory language must be considered. At the time, the language of the Patent Act was 
quite explicit in stating that damages for infringement "may be recovered by action on 
the case, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names of 
the person or persons interested, whether as patentees, assignees, or as grantees of the 
exclusive right within and throughout a specified part of the United States.',42 Thus, 
the Patent Act stipulated by statute, not just the categories of persons entitled to 
enforce the patent, but the particular name under which the action must be brought. 
The name had to be that ofa patentee, assignee (of title to the patent itself), or grantee 
(of exclusive rights within a geographic region). This specificity accords with the 
indivisible view of patent rights expressed in Waterman and lends support to the 
Supreme Court's holding in Crown Die that Congress did not intend for a patent 
infringement claim to be assignable independent of the underlying patent right. 
B. Copyright Infringement: Prather, Eden Toys, and ABKCO 
The assignability of copyright infringement claims has never been addressed by 
the Supreme Court. However, the Second and Fifth Circuits had each faced the 
question in a variety of guises, prior to the Silver case.43 
In Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, the Fifth Circuit found accrued copyright 
infringement claims to be freely assignable, independent of the ownership of the 
underlying copyright.44 Prather had authored several books for which his publisher, 
Fawcett Publications, owned the copyrights. 45 Neva Paperbacks and several other 
defendants, who admitted their infringement at trial, blatantly plagiarized the books. 46 
Upon learning of the infringement, Prather secured an assignment from his publisher 
of any accrued cause of action for infringement of the copyrights. 47 The same 
agreement also purported to contain an assignment of title in the copyrights to Prather, 
39. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments§§ 185-86 (1999). 
40. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 (1923). 
41. Id. at 40. 
42. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836). 
43. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991); Eden Toys, Inc. 
v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982); Pratherv. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 
(5th Cir. 1969). 
44. Prather, 410 F.2d at 699. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 698. 
47. Id. at 699. 
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with a simultaneous exclusive license back to Fawcett of the English language 
publishing rights in the books. 48 Under the 1909 Copyright Act's indivisible ownership 
doctrine which governed the case, such a simultaneous assignment and license back 
was suspect. 49 Thus, when Prather won a judgment against the infringers in district 
court, the infringing defendants appealed with the "beguiling" argument that they had 
been sued by the wrong party because the assignment of title in the underlying 
copyrights to Prather was an ineffective transfer of ownership. 50 
Writing for a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit, Chief Judge Brown rejected 
this argument, finding instead "a simple, simple basis" on which to decide the case, 
avoiding "altogether the button game of 'copyright, copyright who has the copy-
right?'"51 The case could be narrowed down, he wrote, to "one of simple assignment 
of a chose in action. "52 He explained that, for an assignment of accrued causes of 
action for copyright infringement to be effective, "[a]ll that is required is that the 
contract cover in no uncertain terms choses in action for past, prior, accrued 
damages." 53 Chief Judge Brown noted that a transfer of title in the copyright itself 
would not, in fact, operate as an assignment of the accrued cause of action for 
infringement unless the accrued claim was also expressly assigned. 54 The accrued 
claim does not run with the ownership of the copyright itself, as an incident to it, but 
rather exists as a separately assignable ( or retainable) item of personal property. 55 
Finally, Chief Judge Brown concluded, "There is no public policy against such 
assignments and under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17] such assignee of all choses 
in action for infringement, whether a 'proprietor' or not, has standing to sue and the 
court has effective power to avoid altogether the risk of double suit or double 
recovery." 56 
A second case that has been cited on the question of the assignability of copyright 
infringement claims arose on very different facts.57 In Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee 
Undergarment Co., Paddington granted Eden Toys an exclusive license to use the 
Paddington Bear characters in certain products. 58 That license contained no 
assignment of any accrued cause of action for infringement, but rather a reservation in 
favor of Paddington of the first option to institute a copyright infringement suit: 
In the event that Eden or its licensees shall be exposed to competition, direct or 
indirect, from infringers of the copyright ... rights which are licensed hereunder ... 
Paddington shall, at its option, take all necessary legal action to enjoin such 
infringement ... In the event of such infringement and Paddington's election to take 
48. Id. at 699 n. l. 
49. Id. at 699. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 700. 
54. Id. (citing Kriger v. MacFadden Publ'ns, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 170, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 27 (2d Cir. 1982). 
58. Id. at 30 n.2. 
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no legal action ... Eden shall have the right ... to institute appropriate legal action 
against the infringer. 59 
447 
Unlike the assignment in Prather, this agreement appears to be an attempt to contract 
around the Copyright Act's standing provisions by reserving for Paddington a greater, 
exclusive option to sue than it would otherwise have under § 50 I (b ), which affords an 
exclusive licensee a right to sue in his own right for infringements of that exclusive 
right, regardless of the copyright owner's actions. 6° Furthermore, as an exclusive 
licensee (and even a potential owner of copyrights of derivative works), Eden's 
standing to bring an infringement suit was not dependent on this provision of the 
agreement. 61 
The court in Eden Toys dealt with the agreement's standing language only in dicta, 
in a footnote. The footnote rejected Eden's claim that standing may arise from 
"authorization by the copyright holder of a suit by a person other than the exclusive 
licensee." 62 Then, the court declared, in oft quoted, conclusory dicta, "We do not 
believe that the Copyright Act permits holders of rights under copyrights to choose 
third parties to bring suits on their behalf. While [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 
17(a) ordinarily permits the real party in interest to ratify a suit brought by another 
party, the Copyright Law is quite specific in stating that only the 'owner of an 
exclusive right under a copyright' may bring suit." 63 
In ABK CO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., the Second Circuit endorsed the 
holding in Prather that accrued copyright infringement claims may be owned 
independently from the underlying copyright, though the case itself presented an 
extremely tangled factual scenario and the court confusingly cited the Eden Toys 
footnote, and not Prather, for support of its assertions. 64 In 1978, ABK CO acquired 
an assignment of the copyright for the song "He's So Fine," along with an assignment 
of accrued claims for infringements of that copyright, which had occurred prior to 
1970.65 George Harrison asserted claims against ABKCO that would have required 
ABK CO to turn the copyright for "He's So Fine" over to Harrison. 66 ABK CO asserted 
that such a turnover would unfairly strip it of its accrued claims for copyright 
infringement. 67 The Second Circuit disagreed. 68 Oddly citing the footnote in Eden 
Toys for support, the court underscored the divisibility of the accrued claim from the 
copyright itself. 69 The court went on to find that "ABKCO's ownership of ... the 
copyrights was not a necessary predicate to its participation" in settlement of an 
infringement suit. 70 Instead, ABK CO had standing to participate in the settlement 
59. Id. 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000). 
61. Eden Toys, Inc., 697 F.2d at 29. 
62. Id. at 32 n.3. 
63. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
64. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980-981 (2d Cir. 1991). 
65. Id. at 975. 
66. Id. at 977. 
67. Id. at 980. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 98 I. 
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"because it owned the infringement claims accrued in 1970, not because it owned the 
copyright." 71 The court concluded that even if ABKCO were forced to surrender its 
title in the copyright, it would continue to be able to enforce its accrued causes of 
action for pre-1970 infringements. 72 
Thus, prior to Silvers v. Sony Pictures, the Fifth and Second Circuits had each 
found, under different factual circumstances, that ownership of accrued copyright 
infringement claims could confer standing to one who did not own the underlying 
copyright. 73 The Second Circuit's footnote dicta in Eden Toys meanwhile asserted that 
copyright holders could not "choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf." 74 The 
inconsistency between these two positions played itself out as the Ninth Circuit decided 
Silvers. 
V. SILVERS V. SONY PICTURES 
Screenwriter Nancey Silvers wrote a made-for-television movie, entitled "The 
Other Woman." 75 Silvers wrote the script as a work-for-hire for Frank & Bob Films, 
so under the terms of the Copyright Act, Frank & Bob Films became the "author" and 
owner of the copyright. 76 Three years after the network broadcast of "The Other 
Woman," Sony Pictures released the feature film "Stepmom." 77 Silvers believed that 
"Stepmom" had infringed the copyright on her screenplay for "The Other Woman." 78 
In order to enable her to pursue an infringement claim against Sony, Frank & Bob 
Films executed an "Assignment of Claims and Causes of Action" in favor of Silvers. 79 
Though the company retained ownership of the underlying copyright in the script, 
Frank & Bob Films granted Silvers "all right, title and interest in and to any claims and 
causes of action against Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Columbia Tri Star, and any 
other appropriate persons or entities, with respect to the screenplay 'The Other 
Woman' ... and the motion picture 'Stepmom."' 80 
Silvers then filed suit against Sony alleging copyright infringement. 81 Sony moved 
to dismiss, claiming that Silvers lacked standing because she did not have a legal or 
beneficial interest in the underlying copyright. 82 The district court denied the motion, 
but allowed Sony to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial. 83 A panel of the 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See id.; Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969). 
74. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982). 
75. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entrn't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
367 (2005). 
76. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other 
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless the 
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all the rights 
comprised in the copyright."). 
77. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 883. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. 84 However, after a 
rehearing en bane, a divided Ninth Circuit reversed. 85 
Judge Graber, writing for the majority, held that the "bare assignment of an 
accrued cause of action is impermissible under 17 U.S.C. § 50l(b)." 86 Judge Graber 
made four arguments to support her conclusion. First, applying the doctrine of 
expressio unius est exc/usio alterius, she reasoned that "Congress' explicit listing of 
who may sue for copyright infringement should be understood as an exclusion of others 
from suing for infringement. "87 Second, she analyzed the legislative history 
surrounding the drafting of the 1976 Copyright Act, finding that "[a ]!though Congress 
allowed for divisibility of ownership interests under a copyright, it did not alter the 
requirement that only owners of an exclusive right in the copyright could bring suit. "88 
Third, Judge Graber concluded that the Copyright Act should be interpreted 
consistently with the Patent Act, citing Crown Die for the proposition that "a bare 
assignment cannot give rise to a cause of action for infringement" under the Patent 
Act. 89 Finally, Judge Graber analyzed cases from other circuits. She distinguished the 
Fifth Circuit's holding in Prather because that case arose under the 1909 Copyright 
Act, rather than the modem statute. 90 Instead, she argued that the Second Circuit's 
analysis in Eden Toys should be followed, in part to avoid a circuit split on this issue. 91 
Judge Berzon dissented, arguing that the majority's opinion was "internally 
inconsistent, provide[ d] inadequate support for its conclusion, and ignore[ d] our 
analogous precedents." 92 The internal inconsistency, she claimed, lay in the majority's 
interpretation of the durational limits in § 501 (b ).93 The literal language of the statute 
provides that the owner of a copyright is not entitled to sue unless the alleged 
infringement occurred ''while he or she [was] the owner of [the copyright right]." 94 
The majority used this strict durational limit as evidence that Congress intended a strict 
limitation on who may have standing to sue for infringement. 95 Yet, Judge Berzon 
pointed out that the majority also acknowledged that this durational limit should not, 
in fact, be applied strictly.96 The majority had inserted a footnote stating that the 
Second Circuit holding in ABKCO made "perfect sense."97 Thus, as Judge Berzon 
summarizes, the majority was willing to concede that"[ a ]fter a copyright holder sells 
84. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en bane, 402 F.3d 881 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
85. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 883. 
86. Id. at 890. Chief Judge Schroeder, and Judges Rymer, Wardlaw, Fisher, Gould, and Paez joined 
in the majority opinion. Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act provides: "The legal or beneficial owner of 
an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that 
particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it." 17 U.S.C. § 50l(b) (2000). 
87. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885. 
88. Id. at 886. 
89. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 887-88. 
90. Id. at 889. 
9 I. Id. at 890. 
92. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting). Judge Berzon's dissent was joined by Judge Reinhart. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 50 I (b ). 
95. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885-86 (majority opinion). 
96. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. at 890 n. l (majority opinion). 
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a copyright, in whole or in part, the new owner may pursue a cause of action that 
accrued before the purchase, as long as the cause of action is transferred along with the 
copyright." 98 Judge Berzon noted, "However practical this analysis, the fact remains 
that it cannot be squared with a literal reading of section 501 (b ), on which the majority 
otherwise rests." 99 
Instead of resting on statutory analysis, then, Judge Berzon recast the question to 
focus on whether "the general goal of the statute would be served by prohibiting the 
type of assignments involved in th[e] case." 100 Judge Berzon then characterized 
Silvers, the creator of allegedly infringed work, as "the person for whom the copyright 
system [was] designed to provide incentives for more creations." 101 She therefore 
concluded that an assignment of claims to Silvers was in accord with the congressional 
goal of promoting creativity. 102 However, she would have limited the scope of the 
holding to assignments in favor of the original creator of works-for-hire. 103 
Judge Bea also dissented, but on much broader grounds than Judge Berzon. 104 
Rather than limiting permissible assignments to those in favor of the original creator 
of the work, Judge Bea would have allowed for unfettered assignability: 
Given the growth of an aftermarket in derivative rights such as puts, calls and credit 
insurance against bankruptcy risks on corporate debt, the notion that an aftermarket 
in accrued causes of action for copyright infringement is to be prohibited is at best 
passe and at worst an unwarranted restraint on alienation. 105 
He analyzed the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act and found, in direct 
contradiction to the majority's conclusions, that in § 50l(b) Congress intended to 
enlarge, not limit, the class of persons who could sue for infringement. 106 Judge Bea 
rejected the majority's use of a maxim of statutory interpretation to read away the 
ambiguities in § 501 (b ). 107 Instead, he argued that the court should look to common 
law to fill in the gaps when a federal statute is silent. 108 He noted that, "[a]s a general 
matter, common law rights existing prior to the enactment of a statute remain in vigor 
unless expressly abrogated by statute." 109 He argued that the assignment of an accrued 
infringement claim is "nothing more than 'simple assignment of a chose in action,"' the 
assignability of which is well-established at common law. 110 
98. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 892 (quoting Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377 
(9th Cir. 1986), which held that a health care provider, assigned accrued causes of action for health welfare 
benefits by his patients, could pursue his ERISA lawsuit, where the ERISA statute was silent as to 
assignment of welfare benefits). 
101. Id. at 894. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 895 (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld joined Judge Bea's dissenting opinion. 
105. Id. at 905. 
106. Id. at 898. 
107. Id. at 899. 
108. Id. at 902. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. (citing Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 410 F.2d 698, 699 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
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The majority's analogy to patent law was unpersuasive, Judge Bea argued, 
because of the Patent Act's distinct legislative history. Instead, Judge Bea noted that 
several other federal statutes with standing provisions similar to § 50 I (b) have been 
read to permit assignment of accrued claims. 111 In copyright infringement claims, he 
asserted, no public policy counsels against assignability of accrued claims. 112 
Copyright claims, he argued, do not implicate the same policy concerns that have led 
to common law prohibitions on assignment of personal injury claims and legal 
malpractice claims. 113 
Finally, Judge Bea turned to an analysis of Prather, Eden Toys, and ABKCO. He 
rejected the majority's attempt to distinguish Prather as based upon an outdated 
version of the Copyright Act. Instead, he argued that Eden Toys was the case that 
should be distinguished because that case was not about the assignment of accrued 
claims. Judge Bea characterized the assignment language in Eden Toys as granting, 
not an assignment of an accrued claim, but rather a contingent assignment of future 
claims. 114 This factual distinction, Judge Bea argued, undermined the majority's 
reliance on the sweeping rationale espoused by the Eden Toys court in a single 
footnote. 115 He also rejected the majority's characterization of the holding inABKCO 
as "limited to the situation in which the same entity purchased both the copyright and 
accrued claims."' 16 Instead, he asserted that under the holding in ABK CO, "ownership 
of the copyright is not a requirement for the enforcement of accrued claims assigned 
to the assignee ... so long as the claims arose during the period when the assignor ... 
was the owner of the copyright." 117 Thus, Judge Bea concluded that if the majority's 
goal was to avoid a circuit split, it should have followed Prather and ABKCO, and 
distinguished Eden Toys. 118 
VI. THE PRESUMPTION PROBLEM: THE ROLE OF COMMON LAW IN DEFINING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
At common law, claims for compensatory damages arising under a statute are 
assignable unless the statute expressly limits the assignability of such claims. 119 The 
claim itself is understood as a discrete piece of personal property. 120 Thus, the 
traditional presumption runs in favor of free alienability of such a claim. Congress 
need not grant a right to assign the chose in action arising from a statutory violation; 
that right exists unless it is explicitly prohibited. In Silvers, the majority reversed this 
presumption: "Copyright is a creature of statute, so we will not lightly insert common 
111. Id. at 903 (citing the Clayton Antitrust Act, the RICO statute, and the ERISA statute). 
112. Id. at 906. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 909 n.22. 
115. Id. at 909; see id. at 889 (majority opinion quoting Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 
697 F.2d 27, 32 n.3 (2d Cir. I 982)). 
116. Id. at 911 (quoting majority opinion at 890). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See discussion supra Part IV. 
120. See discussion supra Part IV. 
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law principles that Congress has left out." 121 Accordingly, the majority understood 
Crown Die to require that "when we consider standing under a statutory scheme 
involving intellectual property, common law doctrine does not apply." 122 Thus, the 
majority's assertion is that Congress legislates against a blank canvas when it comes 
to intellectual property and courts cannot ever use common law to help fill in the gaps 
in the statute. 
Such an assertion is at odds with the very notion of common law in our system. 
The Supreme Court has stated that, where common law exists, "Congress does not 
write upon a clean slate." 123 Instead, ''to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute 
must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law." 124 As Judge Bea 
aptly described in his dissent, the common law principle of assignability of accrued 
claims has been applied to other similarly drafted federal statutes; although each statute 
defines a class of persons entitled to institute an action, these causes of action, once 
accrued, have been held to be assignable. 125 
An assertion that common law never applies in a copyright context also proves far 
too much. To take a simple example: under§ 106 of the Copyright Act, the owner of 
a copyright may "authorize" others to make copies of her work. 126 That is virtually the 
only mention in the Act of the ability to grant non-exclusive licenses. Non-exclusive 
licenses are thus contemplated by the Act, but completely governed by common law 
principles of contract formation and enforceability. 127 Similarly, under§ 501 (b ), "the 
legal ... owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an 
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the 
owner of it. "128 But the Act is silent regarding what the owner of such an entitlement 
''to institute an action" may do with it after the right has arisen. 129 Just as the common 
law of contracts steps in to fill in the details of non-exclusive licensing where Congress 
121. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885. 
122. Id. at 888. 
123. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,534 (1993). 
124. Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,625 (1978)). 
125. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 903 (Bea, J., dissenting). The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, "provides 
that 'any person who shall be injured' can sue and yet courts have interpreted the statute to confer standing 
on assignees of antitrust claims." Id. The ERISA statute represents an even closer parallel to the language 
of the Copyright Act. It provides: "A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary ... to 
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan .... " 29 U .S.C. § 1132( a )(2000)( emphasis added). 
Although the statute expressly prohibits assignment of claims for pension benefits, the Ninth Circuit itself 
found that health and welfare claims were nonetheless assignable to persons who were neither participants 
nor beneficiaries. Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Health & Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (9th 
Cir. I 986) (per curiam). 
126. 17 u.s.c. § 106 (2000). 
127. 3 NIMMER, supra note IO,§ 10.08. 
128. 17 U.S.C. § 50I(b)(2000). 
129. If indeed Congress writes upon a blank slate, then perhaps the majority could argue that the owner 
of such an entitlement may do nothing at all with such an entitlement except bring the suit. However, the 
majority does not make this assertion. Instead, the majority admits that a "practical exception" exists 
allowing the owner of the entitlement to assign it to another along with his rights in the underlying 
copyright. Alternatively, the owner of the entitlement may retain the accrued claim while assigning the 
copyright. The roots of this "practical exception" appear to lie, not in statute, but in the common law. This 
problem with the majority's reasoning is addressed more fully in the next section of this Note. 
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was silent, the common law of choses in action must step in to fill in the details on 
assignments of accrued claims. 
Finally, the reversal of the presumption that common law applies paradoxically 
vests far too much power in the hands of a single court. Although it is couched as 
deference to congressional intent, the majority's refusal to apply common law 
principles in this case enables the court to dodge both the express language of the 
statute 130 and the common law, and impose its own third interpretation riddled with 
logical inconsistencies. The next section of this Note attempts to untangle one of these 
logical flaws in the majority's opinion. 
VII. THE TIMING PROBLEM: FINDING A LOGICALLY CONSISTENT 
READING OF§ 50l(B) 
As the Silvers majority itself points out, § 50 I (b) contains a durational limitation: 
"Congress restricted even the legal or beneficial owner of a copyright; the owner is not 
entitled to sue unless the alleged infringement occurred 'while he or she [was] the 
owner of it. "' 131 The majority marshals this durational limitation in support of its 
conclusion that "Congress' grant of the right to sue was carefully circumscribed." 132 
Then, at the end of its opinion, the majority faces the task of explaining away the 
holding in ABKC0. 133 It purports to accomplish this by reducing ABK CO to a single 
question: "[T]he only issue was one of timing, whether ownership of the copyright and 
occurrence of the infringement had to coincide." 134 The durational limitation in the 
text of§ 50 l (b) indicates that they must indeed coincide, as the court had noted earlier 
in its own opinion. 135 And yet here, the majority instead determines that ABKCO's 
"holding makes perfect sense" and "is consistent with the Act" in finding that ABKCO, 
as holder of the accrued claim for infringement may sue by virtue of the assignment, 136 
despite its failure to qualify under the durational requirement in the express language 
of§ 50l(b). The majority accepts this ABKCO exception to the durational require-
ment, so long as assignments of accrued claims are limited to assignments in favor of 
a new owner of the copyright itself. 137 
In order to fully understand the logical flaw in the majority's explanation of the 
ABK CO exception, we must unpack the two potential interpretations of the express 
language in § 50 l (b ). The first possibility is that § 50 l (b) circumscribes completely 
who may bring a copyright infringement action in a federal court in his or her own 
name. Under this reading, only an owner of an exclusive right when that right was 
infringed may bring the suit. Section 50 I (b ), thus, would have to be construed as an 
130. As described in the next section of this Note, § 50 I (b) contains a durational limit on standing that 
the majority marshals for support at the beginning of its opinion and then dismisses as impractical at the 
end of its opinion. 
131. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 890. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 885. 
136. Id. at 890. 
137. Id. 
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absolute bar on the assignment of an accrued cause of action for copyright infringe-
ment.138 This construction could not be reconciled with the ABK CO exception. 
The second possibility is that § 501 (b) defines the class of persons in whom an 
infringement cause of action accrnes at the time the infringement occurs. 139 This 
reading of the statute is consistent with the express language of the statute and would 
accord with the common law understanding of an accrued cause of action as a discrete 
piece of personal property. This reading also renders the statute completely silent 
regarding the assignability of such an accrued cause of action. As such, it could be 
reconciled with the holding in ABKCO. 
Under either of these readings, the express language of the statute defines a class 
of persons-limited to owners of exclusive rights at the time those rights are 
infringed-who are entitled to a particular statutory right. The distinction between the 
two readings lies in the definition of that right. 140 However, the majority effectively 
rejects both of these plausible readings of the statute and opts instead for an untenable 
third interpretation that gives no meaning at all to the phrase "committed while he or 
she is the owner ofit." Under the majority's interpretation, Congress "carefully cir-
cumscribed" its grant of the right to sue as limited to owners of an exclusive right in 
the copyright, but was not serious when it limited the infringing acts for which that 
owner could sue to those that had occurred while he or she was the owner of that 
copyright. 
VIII. THE PA TENT LAW PROBLEM: INTERPRETING APPLES 
WITH THE HELP OF ORANGES 
The underlying rationale of the majority's opinion rests solely on an analogy to 
patent law and a reliance on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the pre-1952 Patent 
Act in Crown Die. In Crown Die, the relevant statutory language was very different 
from the language of§ 50 l (b) of the modem Copyright Act. It provided that damages 
for infringement could be "recovered by action on the case, in any court of competent 
jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names of the person or persons interested, 
whether as patentees, assignees, or as grantees of the exclusive right within and 
throughout a specified part of the United States." 141 This language is far more specific 
than § 501 (b ); it probably could not have been construed to define merely the class of 
persons in whom the infringement claim accrnes when the infringement occurs. 
Instead, by its own terms, the pre-1952 Patent Act describes the only three classes of 
138. As Judge Bea points out in his dissent, this reading of the statute would "preclude an assignee of 
the copyright and the accrued causes of action from suing on an accrued cause of action-which 
infringement, by definition was not 'committed while he or she was the owner ofit.'" Id. at 901 (Bea, J., 
dissenting). By the same token, such a reading would "convert a claim for relief for infringement into a life 
estate" because the copyright owner's heirs, by definition did not own the copyright when the infringement 
occurred. Id. 
139. This possibility is elucidated nicely in Silvers's brief. Appellee's Answering Briefat *8-9, Silvers 
v. Sony, 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 01-56069). 
140. The majority spends considerable effort applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, to argue that this class should not be expanded. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 885. But this argument 
completely misses the heart of the controversy-the question is not the scope of the class but the nature of 
the right conferred on that class. 
141. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 41 (1923). 
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persons who may be named as plaintiffs in an infringement suit. This limitation on the 
names that can appear on the complaint appears to speak directly to the question of 
whether accrued claims could be severed from patent ownership; clearly, under this 
statutory language, they could not be. This conclusion is not based on the special 
nature of the patent monopoly, but rather the text of the statute itself. Rather than 
ignoring common law as the majority in Silvers suggested one could, the Crown Die 
holding actually accords with the common law principle that choses in action are 
assignable unless expressly prohibited by statute. 142 
By contrast, the Copyright Act has never contained a provision for who must be 
named in an infringement complaint. The Copyright Act of 1909 provided that the 
"proprietor" of the copyright had a right to recover damages for infringement; it did 
not specify whether it could assign this right to someone else. 143 Thus, in Prather, the 
Fifth Circuit applied the common law principle permitting assignments of accrued 
claims in the absence of statutory language to the contrary, and held that Fawcett's 
assignment to Prather of the accrued claim was sufficient to grant Prather standing to 
sue, whether or not he also had been effectively assigned the copyright itself. 144 
The majority distinguishes Prather by emphasizing that it was decided under the 
1909 version of the Copyright Act, which contained different language. 145 Such a 
distinction might be tenable if the majority offered a consistent reading of the 1976 Act 
to trump Prather. But it does not. Instead, the Silvers majority relies on Crown Die, 
which was decided, not just under an old version of statutory language, but under an 
old version of an entirely different statute. Furthermore, with the unbundling of 
ownership rights in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress directly removed any parallels 
that may have existed between the standing requirements under the Patent and 
Copyright Acts. 
IX. WHO BENEFITS WHEN ASSIGNMENTS OF COPYRIGHT 
CLAIMS ARE RESTRICTED? 
Ultimately, even if the rationale of the majority opinion is shaky, a restriction on 
the assignability of claims could theoretically be justified if such free assignability 
represented a threat to the "difficult balance" Congress has struck in the Copyright Act, 
"between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their 
142. Today, the section of the Patent Act at issue in Crown Die has disappeared. In its place, the modem 
Act provides only that "[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent." 35 
U.S.C. § 281 (2000). Thus, it is potentially an open question whether the holding in Crown Die remains 
good law. Likely, a court would find that "Congress does not legislate on a clean slate" and so, in the patent 
realm, the common law ( established by Crown Die) against the assignability of patent infringement claims 
would be used to understand the ambiguous language in § 281 of the modem Act. This is a topic for 
another day. However, the questionable vitality of Crown Die itself certainly argues against its extension 
into the copyright realm. 
143. 17 U.S.C. § IOl(b) (1952) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000)). Section IOI of the 1909 
Act provided: "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws 
of the United States such person shall be liable: ... (b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages 
as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the 
infringer shall have made from such infringement .... " 
144. Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, 410 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1969). 
145. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 889. 
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writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free 
flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." 146 However, no such 
threat exists. In fact, free assignability of infringement claims would likely increase 
the value of the copyrighted works, benefiting authors and encouraging innovation, and 
increase the predictability of copyright enforcement, benefiting society's interest in 
''the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce." 
Allowing for free assignability of infringement claims would benefit authors by 
making their copyrights more valuable. This increase in value arises from the ability 
to enforce one's copyright without bearing the full risk of litigation expenses. If that 
risk can be transferred to a party with a higher risk-bearing ability, the copyright holder 
can extract value from her copyright that otherwise would be inaccessible to her. This 
is because risk-bearing ability is fundamentally tied to wealth. 147 Take for example, 
a struggling author who has only published a single, relatively obscure book, in which 
she retains the copyright. Imagine that a large, wealthy television production company 
produces a movie that borrows the entire story-line from our struggling author's book. 
The author seeks legal advice and finds out that she could be entitled to substantial 
damages in an infringement suit. However, because of the non-literal nature of the 
copying, the case will be difficult to prove; the lawyer estimates that she has a 60% 
chance of winning the suit and that lawyers fees will be about $25,000. If$25,000 
represents our author's entire life savings, she may well decide that she cannot pursue 
any action at all against the television studio because she cannot tolerate the 40% risk 
that she would lose her entire life savings. 148 
However, a wealthy investor (or perhaps her publishing house) would perform a 
very different calculation. The wealthy investor would discount the claim for risk and 
for litigation costs and still find that, on average, the accrued infringement claim 
represented an attractive investment prospect. The wealthy investor could thus offer 
to buy the claim from the author and pursue the litigation. If claims are not assignable, 
the author is left with no ability to enforce her rights or recover damages--effectively 
the copyright is worthless to her because of her low risk-bearing ability unless she sells 
the copyright itself. On the other hand, if claims are assignable, she will be able to 
benefit from her copyright by selling and assigning the infringement claim to another 
party who is able to take on the risks oflitigation. 
Judge Berzon's dissent suggests a more limited ability to transfer accrued 
infringement claims only back to the "original creator" of the contested work. 149 She 
justifies this limitation by finding it in accord with the "'overall purposes of the 
Copyright Act. '" 150 Though this analysis seems to work under the facts in the Silvers 
case, the rule generalizes poorly. In Silvers, the creator of a work-for-hire was better 
able, for whatever reason, to pursue litigation against Sony than her employer, Frank 
& Bob Films. However, generally, the economics will run in the opposite direction: 
authors who hold copyrights may be the ones who will directly benefit from finding 
146. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984). 
147. Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1532-33 (1996). 
I 48. See id. at 1533. Dobner spins a very similar hypothetical example ofa holder ofa lottery ticketthat 
the lottery commission refuses to honor. Id. 
149. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 890. 
150. Id. at 892 (alteration in original) (quoting Gulfstream ill Assocs. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 
995 F.2d 425, 438 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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someone else who is willing to pursue the claim. Ifassignments ofaccrued claims may 
only be made to an "original creator," authors themselves will not be able to assign 
claims to more risk-tolerant third-parties and will not be able to enforce their copyright 
rights without selling their underlying copyright rights along with the accrued claim. 
This limited transferability of claims would not, in fact, improve the ex ante incentives 
for creativity that lie at the heart of the Copyright Act. A rule of broad transferability 
of accrued claims, on the other hand, would serve authors better, by allowing them to 
create without worrying about the financial risk associated with undertaking any 
litigation to protect their creations. 
Opponents of this broad transferability rule spin out a slippery slope of multiple, 
potentially overlapping lawsuits. 151 However, the Copyright Act itself provides 
safeguards to protect against such inefficient litigation: 
The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action with a copy of 
the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright Office or 
otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall require that such 
notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision 
in the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit the intervention, of 
any person having or claiming an interest in the copyright. 152 
The broad language of the recordation provision in the Copyright Act means that 
assignments of accrued infringement claims can ( and should) be recorded in the 
Copyright Office as a document "pertaining to a copyright." 153 Thus, the courts will 
have at their disposal the tools necessary to consolidate and streamline infringement 
litigation, even if accrued claims are assignable. 154 
Advocates of the "commons" might criticize the assignability of infringement 
claims simply because it would make infringement suits more frequent. However, a 
robust commons is created not by setting up artificial barriers to copyright enforce-
ment, i.e., the relative risk-tolerance and wealth of a copyright owner, but rather by 
carefully delineating the metes and bounds of the commons by fully litigating the scope 
of the protection afforded by the Copyright Act. Even the fiercest advocates of the 
commons are likely to agree that the debate about the scope of copyright protection 
ought to be fought on the merits, rather than allowing wealthier infringers to simply get 
a free ride by limiting copyright holders' ability to sue with artificial standing 
restrictions. 
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the Ninth Circuit's decision to limit the assignability 
of accrued infringement claims will be large, wealthy companies who infringe on the 
work of small companies and individual authors, knowing that those copyright owners 
will not be able to afford to enforce their rights. Such an outcome cannot have been 
the purpose of the Copyright Act. 
151. See, e.g., Appellant's Opening Briefat *15-16, Silvers v. Sony, 403 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 
01-56069). 
152. 17 u.s.c. § 501(b) (2000). 
153. 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2000). 
154. The argument against allowing transfers of accrued claims is similar to the arguments against 
extending the right to sue to exclusive licensees. Congress rejected these concerns and provided tools to 
mitigate the effects of the expansive standing provision in § 50 I (b ). 
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